Sequent systems for negative modalities by Lahav, Ori et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
05
94
5v
2 
 [c
s.L
O]
  2
5 J
ul 
20
17
Sequent systems for negative modalities
Ori Lahav, Joa˜o Marcos and Yoni Zohar
Abstract. Non-classical negations may fail to be contradictory-forming
operators in more than one way, and they often fail also to respect
fundamental meta-logical properties such as the replacement property.
Such drawbacks are witnessed by intricate semantics and proof systems,
whose philosophical interpretations and computational properties are
found wanting. In this paper we investigate congruential non-classical
negations that live inside very natural systems of normal modal logics
over complete distributive lattices; these logics are further enriched by
adjustment connectives that may be used for handling reasoning under
uncertainty caused by inconsistency or undeterminedness. Using such
straightforward semantics, we study the classes of frames characterized
by seriality, reflexivity, functionality, symmetry, transitivity, and some
combinations thereof, and discuss what they reveal about sub-classical
properties of negation. To the logics thereby characterized we apply a
general mechanism that allows one to endow them with analytic ordi-
nary sequent systems, most of which are even cut-free. We also inves-
tigate the exact circumstances that allow for classical negation to be
explicitly defined inside our logics.∗
Keywords. Negative modalities, sequent systems, cut-admissibility, an-
alyticity.
1. Capturing the impossible, and its dual
Denying instead of affirming. Many well-known subclassical logics —inclu-
ding intuitionistic logic and several many-valued logics— share the conjunc-
tion-disjunction fragment of classical logic, but disagree about the exact no-
tion of opposition and the specific logical features to be embodied in nega-
tion. In contrast, modal logics are often thought of as superclassical, and
are obtained by the addition of ‘positive modalities’ 2 and ♦. For various
∗A preliminary and abbreviated version of the results in this paper was presented at
the 11th International Conference on Advances in Modal Logic (cf. [22]).
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well-known cases, such modalities fail to have a finite-valued characteriza-
tion. Notwithstanding, each m-ary connective D of a modal logic is typi-
cally congruential (with respect to the underlying consequence relation ⊢),
in treating equivalent formulas as synonymous: if αi ⊢ βi and βi ⊢ αi, for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then D(α1, . . . , αm) ⊢ D(β1, . . . , βm). To logical systems
containing only such sort of connectives one might associate semantics in
terms of neighborhood frames (see ch.5 of [40]), and the same applies if one
uses 1-ary ‘negative modalities’ instead, as in [34]. The family of systems
enjoying congruentiality (a.k.a. ‘replacement property’) goes sometimes un-
der the name of ‘classical modal logics’ (cf. [36]). As a matter of fact, the
family of ‘normal modal logics’ makes its 1-ary positive modalities respect a
stronger property: if α ⊢ β then D(α) ⊢ D(β). Such monotone behavior may
be captured by semantics based on Kripke frames, and the same applies to
the antitone behavior that characterize negative modalities, namely: if α ⊢ β
then D(β) ⊢ D(α).
Some of our ancestors. In [11] an investigation of negative modalities is ac-
complished on top of the ∧∨⊤⊥-fragment of classical logic, and the same base
language had already been considered in [33] for the combination of positive
and negative modalities. Typically, in studies of positive and negative modal-
ities the so-called compatibility (bi-relational) frames are used, and certain
appropriate conditions upon the commutativity of diagrams involving their
two relations are imposed, having as effect the heredity of truth (i.e., its per-
sistence towards the future) with respect to one of the mentioned relations
(assumed to be a partial order). There are a number of studies (e.g. [38, 9])
in which the above mentioned languages for dealing with negative modalities
are upgraded in order to count on an (intuitionistic or classical) implication,
and sometimes also its dual, co-implication (cf. [32]). If one may count on
classical implication, however, it suffices to add to it the modal paraconsis-
tent negation given by ‘unnecessity’ (cf. [26]), and all other connectives of
normal modal logics turn out to be definable already from such an impov-
erished basis (indeed, where ` is a primitive symbol for unnecessity and ⊃
represents classical implication, we have that ∼α := α ⊃ `(α ⊃ α) behaves
as the classical negation of α, and 2α := ∼`α behaves as the usual positive
modality box). In the particular case of S5, an even simpler definition of
necessity is within reach (cf. [4]), namely 2α := ``α.
Paraconsistency and paracompleteness. Our basic intuition about the rela-
tion between a paracomplete (a.k.a. ‘intuitionistic-like’) negation and a para-
consistent negation is that the former would be expected to be more demand-
ing than the latter, while classical negation had better sit between the two
(whenever it also turns out to be expressible). It takes indeed more effort to
assert a negated statement on constructive grounds, while such statements
are more readily asserted should some contradictions be allowed to subsist;
in other words, one could say that negations in a paracomplete logic come
at a greater cost than classical negations, while paraconsistent logics indulge
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on negations in which classical logic would show greater restraint. The pres-
ence of a classical negation, however, often makes it too easy to forget that
there are two distinct kinds of deviations equally worth studying, concerning
non-classical negation, for one of these deviations may then be recovered in
the standard way as the dual of the other. However, duality does not presup-
pose definability: in the case of the basic language for positive modal logic
(cf. [10]), it is well-known that no classical negation is definable, and that the
positive modalities are not interdefinable (cf. [6]).
A richer language in which to study negative modalities. Assume that ¬ is
a 1-ary symbol for negation. According to the classical ‘consistency assump-
tion’, [CA], there is no state of affairs v and no formula ϕ such that [Inc]
both ϕ and ¬ϕ are satisfied in v. The dual ‘determinedness assumption’,
[DA], has it that there is no state of affairs v and no formula ϕ such that
[Und] both ϕ and ¬ϕ are left unsatisfied in v. Whenever a logic contains a
negation that behaves non-classically, at least one of the above mentioned
assumptions is bound to fail. The so-called ‘Logics of Formal Inconsistency’
(LFIs) provide tools for recovering [CA], by offering in their language a 1-ary
connective C such that Cϕ is left unsatisfied in v whenever [Inc] happens to
be the case. Dually, the ‘Logics of Formal Undeterminedness’ (LFUs) offer
a 1-ary connective D such that Dϕ is satisfied in v whenever [Und] happens
to be the case. The LFIs and LFUs investigated in the present paper are in
fact a little bit stronger than that: in them, Cϕ is left unsatisfied iff [Inc] is
the case, and Dϕ is satisfied iff [Und] is the case. The ‘adjustment’ (a.k.a.
‘restoration’) connectives C and D are meant to exclude the scenarios in which
negation deviates from [CA] and [DA], and to allow for a given reasoner, if
that be the case, to recover an intended classical behavior from within a
non-classical environment.
On the availability of classical negation. In order to get a better grasp of the
duality between paraconsistent and paracomplete modal negations (namely,
unnecessity vs. impossibility), we here purposefully make an effort to prevent
the underlying language from being sufficiently expressive so as to allow for
the definition of a classical negation (or a classical implication) — whenever
such goal lies within reach. As we will see, in fact, all normal modal logics in
the basic language of negative modalities that happen to fail the consistency
and the determinedness assumptions also fail to be expressive enough so as to
allow for a classical negation to be defined, but in a few cases the definability
is within reach if adjustment connectives are employed. It should be noted,
though, that as a byproduct of the presence of the above mentioned adjust-
ment connectives truth will no longer be hereditary in our Kripke models,
that is, it will not in general be preserved for all compound formulas towards
the future — this stands in stark contrast with what happens with models
of compatibility frames.
What is to follow. In this paper, first and foremost we will concentrate on
the logic PK, determined by the class of all Kripke frames, which has been
introduced and received a presentation as a sequent system in [8], against a
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theoretical background of definitions situated at the level of abstract conse-
quence relations. We show here that this logic can be reintroduced in terms of
a so-called ‘basic sequent system’, which allows one to take advantage of gen-
eral techniques developed in [21], including a method for proving soundness
and completeness with respect to the Kripke semantics of PK (given in [8]),
as well as a uniform recipe for semantic proofs of cut-admissibility or analyt-
icity. After that we apply a similar strategy to the study of several extensions
of PK that happen to validate principles distinctive of classical negation, and
next we also investigate the explicit definability of classical negation within
our logics. Before devoting ourselves to that task, though, the next section
shall adopt a semantical perspective to explain the circumstances in which
our study is developed.
2. On negative modalities
We briefly recall the now standard components of a Kripke semantics. A frame
is a structure consisting of a nonempty set W (of ‘worlds’) and a binary (‘ac-
cessibility’) relation R on W . A(n ordinary) model M = 〈F , V 〉 is based on
a frame F = 〈W,R〉 and on a valuation V : W × L → {f, t} that assigns
truth-values to worlds w ∈W and sentences ϕ of a propositional language L
generated over a denumerable set of propositional variables P . The valuations
must satisfy certain conditions that are induced by the fixed interpretation
of the connectives of the given language. When V (w,ϕ) = t we say that V
satisfies ϕ at w, and denote this byM, w  ϕ; otherwise we writeM, w 6 ϕ
and say that V leaves ϕ unsatisfied at w. The connectives from the posi-
tive fragment of classical logic receive their standard boolean interpretations
locally, world-wise, by recursively setting:
[S⊤] M, w  ⊤
[S∧] M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w  ϕ and M, w  ψ
[S∨] M, w 6 ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w 6 ϕ and M, w 6 ψ
Given formulas Γ ∪ ∆ of L, and given a class of frames E , we say that Γ
entails ∆ in E , and denote this by Γ |=E ∆, if for each model M based on
a frame F ∈ E and each world w of M we have either M, w 6 γ for some
γ ∈ Γ or M, w  δ for some δ ∈ ∆. The assertion Γ |=E ∆ will be called a
consecution; when such assertion happens to be true we may also say about
each frame in E that it validates the given consecution. In the next section
we will extend the notion of entailment so as to cover sequents instead of
formulas. The subscript E shall be omitted in what follows whenever there is
no risk of ambiguity.
In the following subsections we extend the above language with con-
nectives whose modal interpretations will be useful for the investigation of
negations in a non-classical congruential setting.
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2.1. Adding negations
Our first extension of the above language proceeds by the addition of a 1-ary
connective `, to be interpreted non-locally (that is, its satisfaction depends
on accessible worlds) as follows:
[S`] M, w  `ϕ iff M, v 6 ϕ for some v ∈ W such that wRv
Accordingly, a formula `ϕ is said to be satisfied at a given world of a model
precisely when the formula ϕ fails to be satisfied at some world accessible
from this given world. In the following paragraph we will show that ` respects
some minimal conditions to deserve being called a ‘negation’, namely, we will
demonstrate its ability to invert truth-values assigned to certain formulas (at
certain worlds).
Let # represent an arbitrary 1-ary connective, and let #j abbreviate a
j-long sequence of #’s. The least we will demand from # to call it a negation
is that, for every p ∈ P and every k ∈ N:
JfalsificatioK #kp 6|= #k+1p JverificatioK #k+1p 6|= #kp
To witness JfalsificatioK, some sentence ϕ is to be satisfied while the sentence
#ϕ is not simultaneously satisfied; for JverificatioK some sentence ϕ is to be
left unsatisfied while at the same time #ϕ is satisfied. To check that the
connective ` fulfills such requisites, it suffices for instance to build a frame
in which W = {wn : n ∈ N} and wRv iff v = w
++ (by which we mean that v
is the successor of w), and consider a valuation V such that V (wn, p) = t iff
n is odd.
It is very easy to see that our connective` satisfies global contraposition
in the sense that α |= β implies `β |= `α. Indeed, assume α |= β and
suppose that M, w  `β for some world w of an arbitrary model M. Then,
[S`] informs us that there must be some world v in M such that wRv and
M, v 6 β. By the definition of entailment, we conclude thus from the initial
assumption that M, v 6 α. Using again [S`] it follows that M, w  `α. As
a byproduct of this, if one defines an equivalence relation ≡ on L by setting
α ≡ β whenever both α |= β and β |= α, then an easy structural induction
on L establishes that ≡ is not only compatible with ` but also with the other
connectives that are used in constructing the algebra of formulas. This means
that ≡ constitutes a congruence relation on L.
It is straightforward to check that any 1-ary connective # satisfying
global contraposition is such that, given p, q ∈ P :
(DM1.1#) #(p ∨ q) |= #p ∧#q (DM2.1#) #p ∨#q |= #(p ∧ q)
If # also respects the following consecutions, then it is said to be a full type
diamond-minus connective:
(DM2.2#) #(p ∧ q) |= #p ∨#q (DT#) #⊤ |= p
Note that our negation ` is a full type diamond-minus connective. To check
that ` satisfies (DM2.2#), indeed, suppose that M, w  `(p ∧ q) for some
arbitrary world w of an arbitrary model M. By [S`] we know that there is
some world v such that wRv andM, v 6 p∧q. It follows by [S∧] thatM, v 6 p
or M, v 6 q. Using [S`] again we conclude that M, w  `p or M, w  `q
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and [S∨] gives us M, w  `p ∨ `q. In addition, to check that ` satisfies
(DT#) one may invoke [S`] and [S⊤]. Note that satisfying (DT#) means
that the nullary connective ⊥ taken as an abbreviation of #⊤ is interpretable
by setting, for every world w of every model M:
[S⊥] M, w 6 ⊥
Given a negation #, we call the logic containing it #-paraconsistent if
the following consecution fails, for p, q ∈ P :
J#-explosionK p,#p |= q
This means that there must be valuations that satisfy both some sentence ϕ
and the sentence #ϕ while not satisfying every other sentence. It is worth
noticing that J`-explosionK holds good in frames containing exclusively worlds
that are accessible to themselves, and to themselves only (such worlds will
be called ‘narcissistic’) and worlds that do not access any other world (such
worlds will be called ‘dead ends’): in the former case, it is impossible to si-
multaneously satisfy both ϕ and `ϕ; in the latter case, the sentence `ϕ is
never satisfied. Note moreover that in the class of all narcissistic frames (those
containing only narcissistic worlds) the connective ` happens to behave like
classical negation, i.e., it behaves like the symbol ∼ in the following semantic
clause:
[S∼] M, w  ∼ϕ iff M, w 6 ϕ
In contrast, in the class of all frames whose worlds are all dead ends the con-
nective ` does not respect [verificatio], and cannot be said thus to constitute
a negation.
We now make a further extension of the above language by adding a
1-ary connective a, non-locally interpreted as follows:
[Sa] M, w  aϕ iff M, v 6 ϕ for every v ∈W such that wRv
It is not difficult to check that again we have a connective that qualifies as
a negation, and satisfies global contraposition. To reinforce the meta-theore-
tical duality between the latter negation and the negation introduced above
through [S`], we will henceforth refer to the previous interpretation clause
in the following equivalent form:
[Sa] M, w 6 aϕ iff M, v  ϕ for some v ∈ W such that wRv
A full type box-minus connective is a 1-ary connective # that respects:
(DM1.2#) #p ∧#q |= #(p ∨ q) (DF#) p |= #⊥
One may easily check that a is indeed a full type box-minus connective.
Given a negation #, we call the logic contaning it #-paracomplete if it
fails the following consecution, for p, q ∈ P :
J#-implosionK q |= #p, p
Such failure will clearly be the case for # = a as soon as we entertain frames
that contain worlds that are neither dead ends nor narcissistic. Otherwise,
we see that a will behave either like classical negation (if all worlds are
narcissistic) or like ⊤ (if all worlds are dead ends).
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In the following sections, unless noted otherwise, we will no longer con-
sider classes of frames containing only frames with worlds that are either dead
ends or narcissistic — accordingly, we will only consider entailment relations
that are `-paraconsistent and a-paracomplete, for the negative modalities
` (assumed to be full-type diamond-minus) and a (assumed to be full-type
box-minus).
2.2. Recovering negation-consistency and negation-determinedness
In what follows we will call a model dadaistic when it contains some world in
which all formulas are satisfied, and call it nihilistic if it leaves all formulas
unsatisfied at some world. It is straightforward to see that the language based
on ∧∨⊤`, with the above interpretations, admits dadaistic models, while the
language based on ∧∨⊥a admits nihilistic models.
Recall that a #-paraconsistent logic allows for valuations that satisfy
certain formulas ϕ and #ϕ while leaving some other formula ψ unsatisfied (at
some fixed world). There might be reasons for disallowing this phenomenon
to occur with an arbitrary ϕ, or for restricting to certain formulas ψ but not
others. A particularly useful way of keeping a finer control over which ‘incon-
sistencies’ of the form ϕ and #ϕ are to be acceptable within non-dadaistic
models is to mark down the formula thereby involved so as to recover a ‘gentle’
version of J#-explosionK. Concretely, for us here, a 1-ary ‘adjustment connec-
tive’ #© that strongly internalizes the meta-theoretic consistency assumption
at the object language level will be such that:
[SC#] M, w  #©ϕ iff M, w 6 ϕ or M, w 6 #ϕ
It is easy to check that any connective #© respecting [SC#] is such that:
(C1#) #©p, p,#p |= (C2#) |= p, #©p (C3#) |= #p, #©p
Note in particular that (C1#) guarantees that there are no valuations that
satisfy (at a fixed world) both p and #p if these are put in the presence of
#©p. Thus, in case # fails J#-explosionK we may look at the latter formula
involving #© as guaranteeing that a weaker form of explosion is available.
On these grounds we shall call the connective #© an adjustment companion
to #: it allows one to recover explosion from within a non-#-explosive (i.e.,
paraconsistent) logical context, and adjust the consecutions of the underlying
logic so as to allow for the simulation of the consecutions that would otherwise
be justified by reference to J#-explosionK. Semantically, the presence of such
connective also guarantees that dadaistic models are not admissible over the
language based on ∧∨⊤`#`, with the above interpretations. This is because
a formula of the form #`ϕ∧ (ϕ ∧`ϕ) is equivalent to a formula ⊥ respecting
[S⊥].
Dually, a #-paracomplete logic allows for valuations that leave the for-
mulas ϕ and #ϕ both unsatisfied (at some fixed world), while satisfying some
other formula ψ. A particular way of keeping a finer control over which ‘inde-
terminacies’ of the form ϕ and #ϕ are to be acceptable within non-nihilistic
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models is to allow for a ‘gentle’ version of J#-implosionK, where a 1-ary con-
nective #© internalizes the meta-theoretic determinedness assumption at the
object language level, in such a way that:
[SD#] M, w 6 #©ϕ iff M, w  ϕ or M, w  #ϕ
Clearly, any connective #© respecting [SD#] is such that:
(D1#) |= #p, p, #©p (D2#) #©p, p |= (D3#) #©p,#p |=
Note that a formula of the form (ϕ ∨ aϕ) ∨ #`ϕ is equivalent to a for-
mula ⊤ respecting [S⊤]. Note, moreover, that whenever it turns out that a
connective # respects J#-explosionK and at the same time its adjustment
companion #© respects [SC#], then the formula #©ϕ is equivalent to ⊤. In an
analogous way, whenever a connective # respects J#-implosionK and at the
same time its adjustment companion #© respects [SD#], the formula #©ϕ is
equivalent to ⊥. This stresses the fact that the adjustment connectives with
which we deal in this subsection are of more interest when they accompany
the respective non-classical negations to whose meaning they contribute.
At this point we have finally finished constructing the richest language
that will be used throughout the rest of the paper: It will contain the connec-
tives ∧∨⊤⊥`#`a#a, disciplined by the corresponding [S#] conditions above.
In the following subsection we will explain precisely when a classical nega-
tion, that is a 1-ary connective ∼ subject to condition [S∼], is definable with
the use of our language. Fixed such language, the logic characterized over
it by the class E of all frames will be called PK; the logic characterized
by the class ED of all serial frames (the frames with serial accessibility re-
lations) will be called PKD; the logic characterized by the class ET of all
reflexive frames will be called PKT ; the logic characterized by the class EFun
of all frames whose accessibility relations are total functions will be called
PKF ; the logic characterized by the class EB of all symmetric frames will be
called PKB; the logic characterized by the class E4 of all transitive frames
will be called PK4; and by PKD4 and PKDB we will refer to the logics
characterized by the classes of all frames whose accessibility relations enjoy
a combination of the two obvious associated properties, in each case.
2.3. Around classical negation
According to the intuitions laid down at Section 1, one could expect that in
general (a) aα ⊢ ∼α and (b) ∼α ⊢ `α. It is easy to see, for instance, that
these consecutions are indeed sanctioned by PKT , for the classical negation∼
that may be defined by setting ∼ϕ := `ϕ ∧ #`ϕ (alternatively, one may set
∼ϕ := aϕ ∨ #aϕ). Indeed, suppose on the one hand that M, w  aα for a
world w of a model M of a reflexive frame. By reflexivity and [Sa] we must
have M, w 6 α, and this is equivalent to M, w  ∼α by [S∼]. On the other
hand, givenM, w 6 α, by reflexivity and [S`] we immediately conclude that
M, w  `α.
Meanwhile, in the deductively weaker logic PKD one cannot in general
prove neither (a) nor (b), even though a classical negation may be defined
in this logic by setting ∼ϕ := (aϕ ∧ #`ϕ) ∨#aϕ. However, one can still easily
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prove in PKD that (c) aα ⊢ `α. Indeed, suppose that M, w  aα. By
seriality and [Sa] we conclude that M, v 6 α for some world v such that
wRv. But then, by [S`] it follows that M, w  `α. In the logic PKF , de-
ductively stronger than PKD (but neither stronger nor weaker than PKT )
one may also prove the converse consecution, (d) `α ⊢ aα. Indeed, suppose
that M, w  `α. There is, by the fact that the accessibility relation is a
total function, a single world v such that wRv. Then M, v 6 α, by [S`].
For a similar reason, invoking now [Sa] we conclude that M, w  aα. Note
that (c) and (d) together make our two modal non-classical negations indis-
tinguishable from the viewpoint of PKF , yet one should not for this reason
imagine, as we will see, that they collapse into classical negation.
The situation concerning classical negation and its relation to its non-
classical neighbours gets even more interesting after one acknowledges that
no classical negation is definable in PK, the weakest of our logics, and also
that no classical negation is definable in the fragment of PKT without nei-
ther of the adjustment connectives, nor in the fragment of PKF (or PKD)
without either one of the adjustment connectives, nor in PKB or in PK4.
Detailed proofs concerning the mentioned results about (non)definability of
classical negation in the modal logics that constitute our present object of
study may be found in Section 6.
Notice that in PKD and its extensions there are no negated formulas
that happen to be true or false at a given world just because there are no
worlds accessible from it. Note also that the logic PKT is: paraconsistent but
not paracomplete with respect to the connective `; paracomplete but not
paraconsistent with respect to a (adapting the result in [3], it may be shown
that this logic is indeed the least extension of the positive implicationless
fragment of classical logic with the latter mentioned properties). In all the
other logics mentioned above, in contrast, both non-classical negations behave
at once as paracomplete and paraconsistent negations (recall, though, that
each negation is associated to a different adjustment connective). We take the
cases among these in which no classical negation is available to be particularly
attractive for the task of revealing the ‘uncontamined’ nature of non-classical
negation. Establishing well-behaved proof theoretical counterparts for such
logics, as we shall do in what follows, is meant to allow for them to be even
better understood and dealt with.
3. A proof system for PK
A sequent calculus for PK, that we denote by PK, was introduced in [8], and
consists of the following rules:
[id]
p⇒ p
[cut]
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ⇒ ∆
[W⇒]
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
[⇒W ]
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
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[⊥⇒]
Γ,⊥ ⇒ ∆
[⇒⊤]
Γ⇒ ⊤,∆
[∧⇒]
Γ, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆
[⇒∧]
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ⇒ ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
[∨⇒]
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆
[⇒∨]
Γ⇒ ϕ, ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,∆
[`⇒]
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
a∆,`ϕ⇒ `Γ
[⇒a]
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
a∆⇒ aϕ,`Γ
[#`⇒]
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ⇒ `ϕ,∆
Γ, #`ϕ⇒ ∆
[⇒#`]
Γ, ϕ,`ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ #`ϕ,∆
[#a⇒]
Γ⇒ ϕ,aϕ,∆
Γ,#aϕ⇒ ∆
[⇒#a]
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ,aϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ #aϕ,∆
Above, sequents are taken to have the form Σ ⇒ Π where Σ and Π are fi-
nite sets of formulas, and given a unary connective # and Ψ ⊆ L, by #Ψ
we denote the set {#ψ | ψ ∈ Ψ}. We write S ⊢PK s to say that there is a
derivation in PK of a sequent s from a set S of sequents. That establishes a
consequence relation between sequents. A consequence relation between for-
mulas is defined by setting Γ ⊢PK ϕ if ⊢PK Γ
′ ⇒ ϕ for some finite subset Γ′
of Γ. The overloaded notation ⊢PK will always be resolved by the pertinent
context. Moreover, using a straightforward induction, it is easy to verify that
we have ϕ ⇒ ϕ for every formula ϕ, and not just for atomic formulas. This
property, called ‘axiom-expansion’ in [1] and ‘id-inductivity’ in [17], is some-
times considered important, when designing sequent systems, for a unique
characterization of the connectives by a collection of rules. It is worth point-
ing out, nevertheless, that various sequent systems for paraconsistent logics—
e.g., the systems in [2]— do not enjoy this property.
We utilize in what follows the general mechanisms and techniques appli-
cable to the so-called ‘basic systems’ of [21] in order to prove soundness, com-
pleteness and cut-admissibility. Actually, we note that the aforementioned
“axiom expansion” can be also proven using these techniques, however, a
simple induction suffices for the particular systems in the present paper.
In [21] one may also find a sufficient condition for a semantic framework to
define the same logic as a given basic system. So, instead of using induction
on derivations in PK for checking soundness, and constructing a canonical
model and a maximal theory for completeness, we just write PK as a basic
system, and verify that our models from Section 2 satisfy this condition.
The viewpoint of basic sequent systems enforces the usual distinction be-
tween side formulas and principal formulas in sequents. Thus, each sequent is
seen as a combination of a ‘main sequent’ (that includes the principal formula)
and a ‘context sequent’ (that includes the side formulas). For an example, in
[⇒∨], the main sequent of the premise is ⇒ ϕ, ψ; the main sequent of the
conclusion is⇒ ϕ∨ψ; and the context sequent of both is Γ⇒ ∆. Note that in
the rules for ` and a, the context sequent of the premise is different from the
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context sequent of the conclusion. Accordingly, [21] introduces the notion of
a basic rule. Each premise in a basic rule takes the form 〈s;π〉, where s is a se-
quent that corresponds to the main sequent of the premise, and π is a relation
between singleton-sequents (that is, sequents of the form ϕ⇒ or⇒ ϕ), called
a context relation, that determines the behavior of the context sequents. The
sequent calculus PK may be naturally regarded as a basic system that em-
ploys two context relations, namely: π0 = {〈q1 ⇒ ; q1 ⇒〉 , 〈⇒ q1 ; ⇒ q1〉},
and π1 = {〈q1 ⇒ ; ⇒ `q1〉 , 〈⇒ q1 ; aq1 ⇒〉}. The rules of PK may then be
presented as particular instances of basic rules. For example, the following
are the basic rules for ∧,`,a and #`:
[⇒∧] 〈⇒ p1;pi0〉 , 〈⇒ p2;pi0〉 / ⇒ p1 ∧ p2 [∧⇒] 〈p1, p2 ⇒;pi0〉 / p1 ∧ p2 ⇒
[`⇒] 〈⇒ p1;pi1〉 /`p1 ⇒ [⇒a] 〈p1 ⇒;pi1〉 / ⇒ ap1
[#`⇒] 〈⇒ p1;pi0〉 , 〈⇒ `p1;pi0〉 / #`p1 ⇒ [⇒#`] 〈p1,`p1 ⇒;pi0〉 / ⇒ #`p1
The system PK employs only one context relation besides π0, and this context
relation uses only one atomic formula q1. Moreover, each rule employs exactly
one of the context relations. In fact, all systems that we explore in this paper
satisfy this property, and their additional context relation is a superset of π1
(the only exception being PKF, below, in which this is only true after `
and a are identified). We therefore actually use only a fraction of the full
generality [21] provides. We shall now use adapted definitions and results
that follow from the latter paper, with the terminology refurbished for this
special case that we are in.
In general, a singleton-sequent x will be said to relate to a singleton-
sequent y with respect to a context relation π if there are singleton sequents x′
and y′ such that x is obtained from x′ and y is obtained from y′ by replacing
q1 with some formula ϕ. By extension, a sequent will be said to relate to
another sequent with respect to π if both sequents can be written as unions
of singleton-sequents that appropriately relate to one another with respect
to π.
In applications of [⇒#`], the context sequent is left unchanged, as two
sequents relate to each other with respect to π0 iff they are the same. In
contrast, applications of [`⇒] are based on π1. Note that a sequent Γ1 ⇒ ∆1
relates to a sequent Γ2 ⇒ ∆2 with respect to π1 iff Γ2 = a∆1 and ∆2 = `Γ1.
Basic systems are endowed with a Kripke semantics. The notion of sat-
isfaction from Section 2 is extended to sequents by settingM, w  Γ⇒ ∆ if
M, w 6 γ for some γ ∈ Γ orM, w  δ for some δ ∈ ∆; in a similar fashion we
may talk now about valid sequents. In the general case, each context relation
is associated with a certain accessibility relation in frames. For the case of π0,
we take here the trivial relation that consists solely of loops. Actually, this
is done implicitly. We simply define the semantic constraints that are asso-
ciated with this relation locally in each world. For π1, on the other hand, we
associate the usual accessibility relation found in the models of our frames.
We stress that the full power of [21], that goes far beyond what we need
here, would require more than one accessibility relation in a single frame. —
to wit, the condition [RRr′ ] (presented below) would need to be verified for
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each accessibility relation that is associated with the context relations that
it employs; furthermore, the condition [RCπ] (also presented below) would
need to be verified for each context relation that occurs in the rules.
For a given basic system G that employs only one context relation π in
addition to π0, Definitions 4.5 and 4.12 of [21] impose what we will call here
a ‘G-legal model’. A model is said to be G-legal if it ‘respects’ the basic rules
and context relations that constitute G, where:
[RRr] respecting a basic rule r that utilizes only π0 amounts to guaranteeing
that in each world the main sequent of the conclusion of r is satisfied when-
ever all main sequents of the premises of r are satisfied;
[RRr′ ] respecting a basic rule r
′ that utilizes only some π 6= π0 amounts to
guaranteeing that in each world the main sequent of the conclusion of r′ is
satisfied whenever all main sequents of the premises of r′ are satisfied at all
accessible worlds; and
[RCπ] respecting a context relation π means that the satisfaction of a single-
ton sequent x at a world u implies the satisfaction of a singleton sequent y
at a world w whenever u is accessible from w and x relates to y with respect
to π.
For an example, [RR[`⇒]] induces the condition: “ifM, v ⇒ ϕ for ev-
ery world v such that wRv, thenM, w  `ϕ⇒”, and this is equivalent to: “If
M, w  `ϕ thenM, v 6 ϕ for some v ∈ W such that wRv”. This amounts to
half of clause [S`], from Section 2. Furthermore, [RCπ1 ] induces an additional
semantic condition: “if wRv then M, w  ⇒ `ϕ whenever M, v  ϕ ⇒”.
This amounts to the other half of clause [S`], namely: “M, w  `ϕ when-
everM, v 6 ϕ for some v ∈W such that wRv”. Systematically applying this
semantic reading to all rules and all context relations of PK, we obtain the
class of all models 〈F , V 〉, where F is an arbitrary frame and each valuation
V : W × L → {f, t} respects the following conditions, for every w ∈ W and
ϕ, ψ ∈ L:
[T⊤] Tw(⊤)
[F⊥] Fw(⊥)
[T∧] if Tw(ϕ) and Tw(ψ), then Tw(ϕ ∧ ψ)
[F∧] if Fw(ϕ) or Fw(ψ), then Fw(ϕ ∧ ψ)
[T∨] if Tw(ϕ) or Tw(ψ), then Tw(ϕ ∨ ψ)
[F∨] if Fw(ϕ) and Fw(ψ), then Fw(ϕ ∨ ψ)
[T`] if Fv(ϕ) for some v ∈W such that wRv, then Tw(`ϕ)
[F`] if Tv(ϕ) for every v ∈W such that wRv, then Fw(`ϕ)
[Ta] if Fv(ϕ) for every v ∈ W such that wRv, then Tw(aϕ)
[Fa] if Tv(ϕ) for some v ∈ W such that wRv, then Fw(aϕ)
[T#`] if Fw(ϕ) or Fw(`ϕ), then Tw(#`ϕ)
[F#`] if Tw(ϕ) and Tw(`ϕ), then Fw(#`ϕ)
[T#a] if Fw(ϕ) and Fw(aϕ), then Tw(#aϕ)
[F#a] if Tw(ϕ) or Tw(aϕ), then Fw(#aϕ)
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where we take ‘Tu(α)’ as abbreviating ‘V (u, α) = t’, and ‘Fu(α)’ as abbrevi-
ating ‘V (u, α) = f ’. If alternatively one just rewrites V (v, α) = t asM, v  α
and V (v, α) = f as M, v 6 α, whereM = 〈〈W,R〉 , V 〉, what results thereby
is a collection of conditions that are essentially identical to the [S#] clauses
introduced in our Section 2. Thus, every model is PK-legal.
Fix in what follows a model M = 〈〈W,R〉 , V 〉. We say that w, v ∈ W
agree with respect to the formula α, according to V , if either (both Tw(α)
and Tv(α)) or else (both Fw(α) and Fv(α)). We say thatM is differentiated
if we have w = v whenever w and v agree with respect to every α ∈ L,
according to V. Now also fix a basic system G that employs only π0 and some
other context relation π. We say that a G-legal model M is G-strengthened
if the converse of [RCπ] holds for V. It is worth stressing that the accessibility
relation of a G-strengthened model is uniquely determined by the underlying
collection of worlds and valuation of this model.
In the case of PK, we note that PK-strengthened means that wRv if
and only if: (i) Fv(ϕ) implies Tw(`ϕ) and (ii) Tv(ϕ) implies Fw(aϕ).
Theorem 3.1 (Corollary 4.26 in [21]). Every basic system G that employs the
context relation π0 and some context relation π such that π1 ⊆ π is sound
and complete with respect to any class of G-legal models that contains all
differentiated G-strengthened models.
Since the class of PK-legal models is the same as the class of models,
we have in particular that the class of models is a class of PK-legal models
that includes all differentiated PK-strengthened models. The following result
from [8] comes as a byproduct:
Corollary 3.2. Γ |=E ϕ iff Γ ⊢PK ϕ for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where E denotes
the class of all frames.
Indeed, Theorem 3.1 provides a mechanism that will be conveniently reuti-
lized in the Section 5, when we consider extensions of PK.
Two brief comments are in order here. First, our valuation functions
assign truth-values to every formula in every world. However, as the values
of compound formulas are uniquely determined by the values of their sub-
formulas, we could have rested content above with assigning truth-values to
propositional variables. Second, given that for the above valuations Tu(α)
is the case iff Fu(α) fails to be the case, the semantic conditions [T#] and
[F#], for each connective #, are clearly the converse of each other. In setting
the two conditions apart, we have just given them directionality, pointing
from less complex to more complex formulas, and have separated between
conditions induced by rules from those induced by context relations. While
neither of these manoeuvres are very useful here, they will allow us to more
easily relate, in Section 4, valuations to ‘quasi valuations’ that have non-
truth-functional semantics. In what follows we will first show that PK is
proof-theoretically very well-behaved, and have a look next at the extensions
of PK.
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4. (Almost) Free Lunch: cut-admissibility and analyticity
In this section we make further use of the powerful machinery introduced
in [21] to prove that PK enjoys strong cut-admissibility, in other words, we
show that S ⊢PK s implies that there is a derivation in PK of the sequent s
from the set of sequents S such that in every application of the cut rule the
cut formula ϕ appears in S. In particular, ⊢PK s implies that s is derivable
in PK without any use of the cut rule.
Cut-admissibility in sequent calculi is traditionally proved ‘through syn-
tactical means’, using induction on the derivation length and the complexity
of the cut formulas (see, e.g., [13]). However, such proofs are usually tedious
and error-prone. One of the major contributions of [21], that is used here as a
substitute of a ‘syntactic proof’, is a semantic criterion for cut-admissibility,
that allows for a smoother semantic proof of cut-admissibility. Moreover, the
modularity of the semantic approach will make it straightforward to adapt
the results of the present section to other variants of PK, that are investigated
in the subsequent section.
The proof is done in two steps. First, we present an adequate semantics
for the cut-free fragment of PK. Second, we show that a countermodel in this
new semantics entails the existence of a countermodel in the form of a Kripke
model as defined in the previous section. This, together with Corollary 3.2,
entails that PK is equivalent to its cut-free fragment.
Step 1. Semantics for cut-free PK
Semantics for cut-free basic systems may be obtained through the use of
‘quasi valuations’. Models based on quasi valuations differ from ordinary
models in two main aspects: (a) the underlying interpretation is three-valued;
(b) the underlying interpretation is non-deterministic — the truth-value of a
compound formula in a given world is not always uniquely determined by the
truth values of its subformulas in the collection of worlds of the underlying
frame.
Concretely, given a basic system G with a context relation π, and a
frame F = 〈W,R〉, a quasi valuation over F is a function QV : W × L →
{{f} , {t} , {f, t}}. We call 〈F , QV 〉 a quasi model. We say that QV satisfies ϕ
at w, and denote this byM, w  ϕ if t ∈ QV (w,ϕ) (instead of QV (w,ϕ) = t,
that we would have had in case this was an ordinary model). 〈F , QV 〉 is G-
legal if it respects all rules of G and respects π. This amounts to conditions
[RRr] and [RCπ ], while taking into account the refined notion of satisfation.
The notions of a differentiated quasi model and of a G-strengthened quasi
model are defined as before, but using the new notion of satisfaction.
To be sure, in the case of PK, this means satisfying precisely the same
semantic conditions laid down in Section 3, where we now take ‘Tu(α)’ as
abbreviating ‘t ∈ V (u, α)’, and ‘Fu(α)’ as abbreviating ‘f ∈ V (u, α)’. When-
ever we need to distinguish between a semantic condition on a tuple 〈w,ϕ〉
as constraining a valuation V or a quasi valuation QV, we will use Xw(ϕ) for
the former and XQw(ϕ) for the latter, where X ∈ {T,F}.
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Step 2. Semantic proof of cut-admissibility
The next step is to show that the existence of a countermodel in the form
of a G-strengthened differentiated quasi model implies the existence a coun-
termodel in the form of a G-legal model (which, in the case of PK simply
means an ordinary model). For this purpose we define an instance of a quasi
model QM = 〈〈W,R〉 , QV 〉 as any model of the form M = 〈〈W,R′〉 , V 〉
such that XQw(ϕ) whenever Xw(ϕ), for every X ∈ {T,F}, every w ∈ W and
every ϕ ∈ L. Note that a quasi model and its instances may have different
accessibility relations.
Indeed, from [21] we have:
Theorem 4.1 (Corollary 5.48 of [21]). For every basic system G, if every G-
strengthened differentiated quasi model has a G-legal instance, then G enjoys
strong cut-admissibility.
And in particular:
Corollary 4.2. If every PK-strengthened differentiated quasi model satisfying
the semantic conditions [T#] and [F#] from Section 3 has an instance (that
satisfies the same conditions), then PK enjoys strong cut-admissibility.
Do note that the latter corollary uses the notion of satisfaction both for
quasi-models and for ordinary models. In what follows, the construction of
appropriate instances is done by a recursive definition over the well-founded
relation ≺ on the set of formulas, taken to be the smallest transitive relation
satisfying the following: (i) if α is a proper subformula of β then α ≺ β; (ii)
`γ ≺ #`γ for every γ ∈ L; and (iii) aγ ≺ #aγ for every γ ∈ L. In what
follows, α  β abbreviates α ≺ β ∨ α = β.
Lemma 4.3. Every quasi model has an instance.
Proof. Let QM = 〈F , QV 〉 be a quasi model based on a frame F = 〈W,R〉.
We set up now an appropriate valuation V : W × L → {f, t}. For every
world w and formula ϕ, the valuation V is inductively defined (with respect
to ≺) on ϕ as follows: (R1) if TQw(ϕ) fails for QV, we postulate Fw(ϕ) to be
the case for V ; (R2) if FQw(ϕ) fails for QV, we postulate Tw(ϕ) to be the case
for V ; (R3) otherwise both TQw(ϕ) and F
Q
w(ϕ) hold good for QV, and in this
case we postulate Tw(ϕ) to be the case for V if one of the following holds:
(M1) ϕ is a propositional variable or ϕ is ⊤
(M2) ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, and both Tw(ϕ1) and Tw(ϕ2)
(M3) ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, and either Tw(ϕ1) or Tw(ϕ2)
(M4) ϕ = `ψ, and Fv(ψ) for some v ∈W such that wRv
(M5) ϕ = aψ, and Fv(ψ) for every v ∈W such that wRv
(M6) ϕ = #`ψ, and either Fw(ψ) or Fw(`ψ)
(M7) ϕ = #aψ, and both Fw(ψ) and Fw(aψ)
Otherwise, we postulate Fw(ϕ) to be the case for V. Obviously, Xw(ϕ) im-
plies XQw(ϕ) for every w ∈ W, every ϕ ∈ L and every X ∈ {T,F}. It is a
routine task to verify that 〈F , V 〉 is a model. We show here that the semantic
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conditions for ` and #` hold:
[Case of `] Let ψ ∈ L. Suppose first that Fv(ψ) is the case for some v ∈ W
such that wRv. Then FQv (ψ). Since QM is PK-legal, then T
Q
w(`ψ) is the
case. If, on the one hand, FQw(`ψ) fails, then we must have Tw(`ψ), by
(R2). If, on the other hand, neither TQw(`ψ) nor F
Q
w(`ψ) fail, we are in case
(R3). Since we have Fv(ψ) and wRv we conclude by (M4) that Tw(`ψ) must
be the case. Suppose now that Tv(ψ) is the case for every world v such that
wRv. Then we have TQv (ψ) for every such world. Since QM is PK-legal, it
follows that FQw(`ψ) is the case. If, on the one hand, T
Q
w(`ψ) fails, then
we must have Fw(`ψ), by (R1). If, on the other hand, neither T
Q
w(`ψ) nor
F
Q
w(`ψ) fail, we are in case (R3). Since we have Tv(ψ) for every world v such
that wRv we conclude that none of (M1)–(M7) applies, thus Fw(`ψ) is to
be the case.
[Case of #`] Let ψ ∈ L. Suppose first that either Fw(ψ) or Fw(`ψ) are the
case for some w ∈W . Then either FQw(ψ) or F
Q
w(`ψ). Since QM is PK-legal,
it follows that TQw(#`ψ). If, on the one hand, F
Q
w(#`ψ) fails, then we must have
Tw(#`ψ), by (R2). If, on the other hand, neither T
Q
w(#`ψ) nor F
Q
w(#`ψ) fail,
we are in case (R3) and we conclude by (M6) that Tw(#`ψ) must be the case.
Suppose now that both Tw(ψ) and Tw(`ψ) are the case for some w ∈ W .
Then TQw(ψ) and T
Q
w(`ψ). Since QM is PK-legal, then F
Q
w(#`ψ). If, on the
one hand, TQw(#`ψ) fails, then we must have Fw(#`ψ), by (R1). If, on the other
hand, neither TQw(#`ψ) nor F
Q
w(#`ψ) fail, we are in case (R3) and Fw(#`ψ) is
to be the case because none of (M1)–(M7) applies. 
Since the class of all PK-legal quasi models contains the PK-strengthened
differentiated quasi models, it follows that:
Corollary 4.4. PK enjoys strong cut-admissibility.
Given a basic system G and a relation < on its set of formulas, we say
that a derivation in G of a sequent s from a set S of sequents is a <-analytic
derivation if every formula ϕ that occurs in the derivation satisfies (ϕ < ψ)∨
(ϕ = ψ) for some ψ in S∪{s}. We then say that G is <-analytic if whenever s
is derivable from S in G there actually is some <-analytic derivation of s
from S in G. In case ϕ < ψ we may also say that ϕ is a proper <-subformula
of ψ.
In view of Cor. 4.4, the inner structure of the rules in PK implies that:
Corollary 4.5. PK is ≺-analytic.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of s from S in PK: In all
rules except for (cut), the premises include only formulas that already appear
in the conclusion or are proper ≺-subformulas of formulas that appear in the
conclusion. 
Note that the ≺-analyticity of PK immediately implies its decidability:
Given a finite set S of sequents and a sequent s, we do not need to search for
an arbitrary derivation of s from S, but it suffices to search for a ≺-analytic
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derivation. Clearly, the set of ≺-analytic derivations whose set of premises
is S is finite, and can be easily computed.
5. Some special classes of frames
In this section we investigate several natural deductive extensions of PK.
Given a property X of binary relations, we call a frame 〈W,R〉 an X frame
if R enjoys X . A (quasi) model 〈F , V 〉 is called an X (quasi) model if F is
an X frame. In addition, and similarly to what we did in the case of PK, for
every proof system Y we write S ⊢Y s if there is a derivation of s from S
in Y .
5.1. Seriality
Let PKD be the system obtained by augmenting PK with the following rule:
[D]
Γ⇒ ∆
a∆⇒ `Γ
This rule may be formulated as the basic rule: 〈⇒ ; π1〉 / ⇒. Since its
premise is the empty sequent, the semantic condition it imposes (follow-
ing [21]) is seriality: indeed, respecting [D] in a world w of a modelM based
on a frame 〈W,R〉 means that ifM, v ⇒ for every world v such that wRv,
then also M, w  ⇒. Since the empty sequent is not satisfied at any world,
this condition would hold iff for every world w there exists a world v such
that wRv. In addition, it is easy to see that every serial model satisfies this
semantic condition.
As in Corollary 3.2, we obtain a completeness theorem for PKD with
respect to serial models:
Corollary 5.1. Γ |=ED ϕ iff Γ ⊢PKD ϕ for every Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ L, where ED is the
class of serial frames.
It would now be straightforward to use rule [D] together with the latter
result to see that (DTa) and (DF`) hold good in the logic PKD (recall from
Section 2.1 that (DT`) and (DFa) hold good for all extensions of PK).
Additionally, we may prove cut-admissibility also for the system PKD,
going through serial quasi models.
Lemma 5.2. Every serial quasi model has a serial instance.
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 4.3. Note that no prop-
erty of the accessibility relation was assumed, and the constructed instance
has the same accessibility relation as the original quasi model. 
Corollary 5.3. PKD enjoys cut-admissibility and is ≺-analytic.
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5.2. Reflexivity
Let PKT be the system obtained by augmenting PK with the following rules:
[T1]
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ `ϕ,∆
[T2]
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ,aϕ⇒ ∆
These rules may be formulated as the basic rules: 〈p1 ⇒ ; π0〉 / ⇒ `p1
and 〈⇒ p1 ; π0〉 /ap1 ⇒ . It should be clear that PKT allows thus for the
derivation of the consecutions representing J`-implosionK and Ja-explosionK.
Semantically, they impose reflexivity not on all models, but only on
PKT-strengthened models. Indeed, since the underlying context relation is
π0, for every model M = 〈F , V 〉 based on a frame F = 〈W,R〉 that respects
[T1] and [T2], and every world w, if M, w  ϕ⇒ then M, w ⇒ `ϕ and if
M, w ⇒ ϕ thenM, w  aϕ⇒. To put it otherwise, if Fw(ϕ) thenTw(`ϕ),
and if Tw(ϕ) then Fw(aϕ). Clearly, every reflexive model satisfies the lat-
ter conditions. To show that every PKT-strengthened model that satisfies
them is reflexive, consider an arbitrary such model M = 〈〈W,R〉 , V 〉. Then
for every world w ∈ W we have that for every formula ϕ, (Tw(ϕ) implies
Fw(aϕ)) and (Fw(ϕ) implies Tw(`ϕ)), which in PKT-strengthened models
means precisely that wRw. We therefore have that every reflexive model is
PKT-legal, and every PKT-strengthened model is reflexive. We obtain thus
a completeness theorem for PKT with respect to reflexive models, relying on
Theorem 3.1:
Corollary 5.4. Γ |=ET ϕ iff Γ ⊢PKT ϕ for every Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where ET is the
class of reflexive frames.
Such semantics for PKT allows one to easily confirm that the full type
diamond-minus connective ` fails (DM1.2#), and that the full type box-
minus connective a fails (DM2.2#). Such failures transfer to the weaker
logics PKD and PK, of course.
Cut-admissibility for PKT may be obtained using arguments similar to
those used in proving Lemma 4.3. It follows thus that:
Lemma 5.5. Every reflexive PKT-strengthened quasi model has a reflexive
instance.
Corollary 5.6. PKT enjoys cut-admissibility and is ≺-analytic.
5.3. Functionality
In this section we address functional frames, that is, frames whose accessibil-
ity relations are total functions. In every model 〈〈W,R〉 , V 〉 of a functional
frame and world w ∈ W , we have Tw(`ϕ) iff Tw(aϕ). Hence ` and a
are indistinguishable. Accordingly, here we consider a restricted language,
without a.
Let PKF be the system obtained from PK by substituting ` for a in
rules [⇒#a] and [#a⇒], and replacing both rules [⇒a] and [`⇒] with the
single rule:
[Fun]
Γ⇒ ∆
`∆⇒ `Γ
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It is straightforward to see that rule [Fun] may be formulated as the follow-
ing basic rule: 〈⇒ ; π2〉 / ⇒, for π2 = {〈q1 ⇒ ; ⇒ `q1〉 , 〈⇒ q1 ; `q1 ⇒〉}.
Note that π2 is obtained from π1 by identifying ` and a. The latter rule
and context relation impose functionality on differentiated models. Indeed,
respecting the basic rule [Fun] corresponds to seriality, similarly to the case
of the rule [D]. Additionally, the context relation π2 forces the accessibil-
ity relation to be a partial function: Respecting π2 in a world w of a model
M = 〈〈W,R〉 , V 〉 means that for every v1, v2 ∈W such that wRv1 and wRv2,
and every formula ϕ, Tv1(ϕ) iff Fw(`ϕ) iffTv2(ϕ). WhenM is differentiated,
this implies that v1 = v2. Now, every functional model satisfies [RRFun] and
[RCπ2 ] and every differentiated model that satisfies them is functional. We
thus obtain a completeness result for PKF with respect to functional models,
relying on Theorem 3.1:
Corollary 5.7. Γ |=EFun ϕ iff Γ ⊢PKF ϕ for every Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where EFun is
the class of functional frames.∗
It should be clear that PKF extends PKD, but does not extend PKT.
Moreover, in contrast with what was the case for PKT, within the semantics
for PKF there are no longer countermodels for (DM1.2`) or for (DM2.2a).
Going through quasi models we may prove cut-admissibility also for
PKF. However, unlike in previous cases, considering functional quasi models
will not suffice. Indeed, there exist PKF-strengthened differentiated quasi
models whose accessibility relation is not a total function. Nonetheless, it
can be verified that every PKF-legal quasi model that is based on a frame
F = 〈W,R〉 is serial, and for every w, v ∈ W such that wRv we have, for
every ϕ ∈ L, both (FQv (ϕ) implies T
Q
w(`ϕ)) and (T
Q
v (ϕ) implies F
Q
w(`ϕ)).
Thus although the accessibility relation in PKF-legal quasi models may not
be a total function, we are still able to extract a functional model from it:
Lemma 5.8. Every PKF-legal quasi model has a functional instance.
Proof. Let QM = 〈F , QV 〉 be an PKF-legal quasi model based on a frame
〈W,R〉. Since QM is PKF-legal, we have in particular that R is serial. There-
fore, there exists some R′ :W →W such that R′ ⊆ R. Let F ′ = 〈W,R′〉. We
define an appropriate valuation V : W × L → {f, t} as in Lemma 4.3, while
disregarding (M5), and using the following two instructions in place of (M4)
and (M7):
(M4⋆) ϕ = `ψ, and FR′(w)(ψ)
(M7⋆) ϕ = #aψ, and Fw(ϕ) and Fw(`ϕ)
The proof then carries on in a similar fashion to the proof of Lemma 4.3. 
Corollary 5.9. PKF enjoys cut-admissibility and is ≺′-analytic, where ≺′ is
the restriction of ≺ to the a-free fragment of L, with an additional clause
according to which `ϕ ≺ #aϕ.
∗We note here that we do not have actual set-inclusion of pi2 in pi1. However, the
language that we consider here identifies ` and a, and this suffices for our version of the
general results from [21].
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We include a brief comment concerning a decision procedure for this
logic. It is easy to see that ` and a may be defined using the customary
presentation of the modal logic K by `ϕ := ∼2ϕ and aϕ := 2∼ϕ. When
considering only functional frames (like in PKF), we get a translation to KF
— the ordinary modal logic of functional Kripke models. For the #`#a-free
fragment of this logic, we may apply the general reduction to SAT proposed
in [23], which in particular means that the derivability problem for it is in
co-NP.
5.4. Symmetry
Let PKB be the system obtained from PK by replacing [`⇒] and [⇒`] with
the following rules:
[B1]
Γ,`Γ′, ϕ⇒ ∆,a∆′
a∆,∆′ ⇒ aϕ,`Γ,Γ′
[B2]
Γ,`Γ′ ⇒ ϕ,∆,a∆′
a∆,∆′,`ϕ⇒ `Γ,Γ′
These correspond to the following basic rules: 〈p1 ⇒ ; π3〉 / ⇒ ap1 and
〈⇒ p1 ; π3〉 /`p1 ⇒, for the context relation
π3 = π1 ∪ {〈`q1 ⇒ ; ⇒ q1〉 , 〈⇒ aq1 ; q1 ⇒〉} .
This relation satisfies the following property: s1 π3 s2 iff s2 π3 s1, where (⇒ ϕ)
denotes (ϕ⇒) and (ϕ⇒) denotes (⇒ ϕ). By Proposition 4.28 of [21], PKB-
strengthened models are symmetric. In addition, every symmetric model re-
spects these rules, as well as the context relation π3: [RRB1 ] and [RRB2 ]
are shown similarly to the case of PK. As for [RCπ3 ], suppose wRu in some
symmetric model M based on a frame F = 〈W,R〉. If V, u  `ϕ ⇒ then
V (u,`ϕ) = 0. Since M is symmetric, we have uRw as well, and since it is a
model, it follows that V (w,ϕ) = 1, which means that V,w ⇒ ϕ. Similarly,
if V, u ⇒ aϕ then V,w  ϕ⇒ . Based on Theorem 3.1, we see that:
Corollary 5.10. Γ |=EB ϕ iff Γ ⊢PKB ϕ for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where EB is
the class of symmetric frames.
Symmetric frames are also relevant from the viewpoint of sub-classical
properties of negation. They validate, for instance, the consecutions ``p |= p
and p |= aap. Table 5 (Section 7), collects these and also many other consecu-
tions representing forms of De Morgan rules that are validated by symmetric
frames. It is also worth noting that Table 1 (Section 7), contains some global
inference rules that are made valid by the demand of symmetry. To check rule
`ϕ |= ψ
`ψ |= ϕ , for instance, assume `ϕ |= ψ and suppose that M, w  `ψ at a
world w of a modelM of some symmetric frame. By [S`] we know that there
must be some world v such that wRv and M, v 6 ψ. From the assumption
it follows that M, v 6 `ϕ. Given that R is symmetric, we know that vRw,
thus we can conclude thatM, w  ϕ, as we intended to. Rule ϕ |= aψ
ψ |= aϕ may be
checked in an analogous way. Paraconsistent logics based on symmetric (and
reflexive) frames are also studied in [3], a paper that investigates in detail a
conservative extension of the corresponding logic, obtained by the addition
of a classical implication (but without primitive a and #a), and offers for this
logic a sequent system for which cut is not eliminable.
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Quasi models for PKB are not necessarily symmetric, making it harder
to convert them into instances in the form of symmetric models. Hence, the
particular question of cut-admissibility for our system PKB goes beyond the
reach of our approach, and is left open as a matter for further research.
However, it can still be shown that PKB is ≺-analytic. Unlike we did for
the above systems, the latter result is not to be obtained as a corollary of
cut-admissibility, but will be shown directly, using a similar technique.
As we did before for cut-admissibility, ≺-analyticity may also be shown
in two steps: First, we present an adequate semantics for analytic derivations
in PKB; second, we show that a countermodel in the new semantics entails
the existence of a countermodel in the form of a Kripke model, as defined in
Section 3. Rather than using quasi valuations, for this purpose we use ‘partial
valuations’. Models based on partial valuations are very similar to the usual
Kripke models. The only difference is that the underlying interpretation is
partial — that is, not defined over all formulas of the language. The exact
same semantic conditions read off the derivation rules is imposed on partial
valuations. Concretely, given a frame F = 〈W,R〉, a partial valuation over it
is a partial function PV from W × L to {f, t} satisfying precisely the same
semantic conditions laid down in Section 3, where each condition is restated
so as to apply only to formulas that are assigned a truth value. We denote
the set of formulas that are assigned a value by a partial valuation PV in a
world w of F by dom(PV,w). For example, [T`] now reads as: if Fv(ϕ) for
some v ∈ W such that wRv and `ϕ ∈ dom(v, w), then Tw(`ϕ).
A partial model is a structure PM = 〈F , PV 〉, where PV is a partial
valuation over F . The notions of a differentiated partial model and of a PKB-
strengthened partial model are defined as before. When dom(PV,w) = X for
every world w of F , we call PM a partial X-model.
Now, Proposition 4.28 of [21] is generalized there (Proposition 5.21) to
cover partial X-models, for any set X of formulas, and thus symmetry is
imposed also on partial models that respect [RCπ3 ].
Theorem 5.11 (Corollary 5.48 of [21]). Let G be a basic system. If, for ev-
ery finite set X that is closed under ≺, it holds that every differentiated
G-strengthened partial X-model can be extended to a G-legal model, then G
is ≺-analytic.
And in particular:
Corollary 5.12. If, for every finite set X that is closed under ≺, it holds that
every differentiated PKB-strengthened partial X-model satisfying the seman-
tic conditions [T#] and [F#] from Section 3 can be extended to a symmetric
model, then PKB is ≺-analytic.
To establish ≺-analyticity, it suffices to show that:
Lemma 5.13. Let X ⊆ L be closed under ≺. Every symmetric PKB-strength-
ened partial X-model can be extended to a symmetric model.
22 Ori Lahav, Joa˜o Marcos and Yoni Zohar
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 4.3. There, we pro-
vided a recursive procedure to eliminate the value {t, f} from a model. Here,
instead of having formulas that are assigned {t, f}, we have formulas that
do not receive any assignment (as the model is partial). We then treat such
unassigned formulas as formulas that have been assigned the value {t, f}.
More concretely, the condition (R3) from the proof of Lemma 4.3 is replaced
from “both TQw(ϕ) and F
Q
w(ϕ) hold good” to “neither T
Q
w(ϕ) nor F
Q
w(ϕ) hold
good”. Then the proof carries on similarly, following the same procedure
induced by (M1)–(M7). 
Thus, using Corollary 5.44 of [21], we conclude that:
Corollary 5.14. PKB is ≺-analytic.
Note that ≺-analyticity for PKB was established directly, not through
cut-admissibility. For this reason, the inner structure of the rules (that does
not enjoy a local ≺-subformula property) did not matter here, but only the
fact that partial models can be appropriately extended.
5.5. Transitivity
Let PK4 be the system obtained from PK by replacing [`⇒] and [⇒`] with
the following rules:
[41]
aΓ,Γ′, ϕ⇒ `∆,∆′
aΓ,a∆′ ⇒ aϕ,`∆,`Γ′
[42]
aΓ,Γ′ ⇒ ϕ,`∆,∆′
aΓ,a∆′,`ϕ⇒ `∆,`Γ′
These correspond to the following basic rules: 〈p1 ⇒ ; π4〉 / ⇒ ap1 and
〈⇒ p1 ; π4〉 /`p1 ⇒, for the context relation
π4 = π1 ∪ {〈aq1 ⇒ ; aq1 ⇒〉 , 〈⇒ `q1 ; ⇒ `q1〉} .
For this relation, we have π4 = π4 ◦ π4. By Proposition 4.28 of [21], the
semantic condition imposed on PK4-strengthened models is transitivity of
the accessibility relation. In addition, every transitive model respects rules
[41] and [42], and also respects the context relation π4. For example, if wRu
and V, u  aϕ⇒, then V (u,aϕ) = 0. This means that there is some v such
that uRv and V (v, ϕ) = 1. By transitivity, we have also wRv and therefore
V (w,aϕ) = 0, which means that V,w  aϕ⇒. Then, Theorem 3.1 gives us:
Corollary 5.15. Γ |=E4 ϕ iff Γ ⊢PK4 ϕ for every Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ L, where E4 is the
class of transitive frames.
From the viewpoint of sub-classical properties of negation, some im-
portant consecutions validated by transitive frames are collected in Table 8
(Section 7). And transitivity also has a role to play at Tables 6 and 7 (Sec-
tion 7), in the presence of appropriate adjustment connectives.
As for cut-admissibility, Prop. 5.21 of [21] guarantees that strengthened
quasi-models that respect [41] and [42] and π4 are transitive as well. In addi-
tion, it is easy to verify that transitive quasi models respect them. Therefore,
arguing about cut-admissibility reduces again to finding an instance to every
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transitive quasi model. Now, since the properties of the accessibility rela-
tion bore no effect on this procedure, as was demonstrated in the proof of
Lemma 4.3, we obtain:
Corollary 5.16. PK4 enjoys cut-admissibility and is ≺-analytic.
5.6. Combining frame properties
In some cases it is also possible to apply our machinery to provide useful
sequent systems for logics whose semantics combine more than one of the
properties studied in isolation in the previous sections. We present two illus-
trations of that in the present section. First we consider the system PKD4
obtained from PK4 by augmenting the latter with the following rule:
[D4]
aΓ′,Γ⇒ ∆,`∆′
aΓ′,a∆⇒ `Γ,`∆′
It corresponds to the following basic rule: 〈⇒ ; π4〉 / ⇒, for the same context
relation π4 defined in Section 5.5. Similarly to what was shown in Section 5.1,
one may now show that every model (and in particular every transitive model)
that respects this rule is serial, and every serial model respects it. The same
holds for quasi models. Together with what we have just seen regarding tran-
sitive (quasi) models, we note that every model that is both transitive and
serial respects [D4] and π4, and every PKD4-strengthened model that re-
spects them is transitive and serial. Proceeding exactly as before, we now
obtain that:
Corollary 5.17. Γ |=EPKD4 ϕ iff Γ ⊢PKD4 ϕ for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where
EPKD4 is the class of serial transitive frames. In addition, PKD4 enjoys cut-
admissibility and is ≺-analytic.
Frames which are at once serial and transitive have a role to play validat-
ing some consecutions concerning qualified forms of explosion and implosion,
found at Table 8 (Section 7).
Next, let PKDB be the system that augments the system PKB with the
following rule:
[DB]
`Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,a∆′
∆′,a∆⇒ `Γ,Γ′
This rule corresponds to the following basic rule: 〈⇒ ; π3〉 / ⇒, for the re-
lation π3 defined in Section 5.4.
Similarly to what was shown in Section 5.1, one may now show that
every model (and in particular every symmetric model) that respects this
rule is serial, and every serial model respects it. The same holds for partial
models. Together with what we have seen in Section 5.4 regarding symmetric
(quasi) models, we have that every model that is both symmetric and serial
respects [DB ] and π3, and every PKDB-strengthened model that respects
them is symmetric and serial. Proceeding exactly as before, we obtain that:
Corollary 5.18. Γ |=EPKDB ϕ iff Γ ⊢PKDB ϕ for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, where
EPKDB is the class of serial symmetric frames. In addition, PKDB is ≺-
analytic.
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Frames which are at once serial and symmetric play a role validating
some mixed double negation consecutions found at Table 7 (Section 7). We
leave it to the reader to check the special form of global contraposition that
is validated by the latter frames, found at the last row of Table 1 (Section 7).
6. Definability of classical negation
In this section we investigate definability of classical negation in the modal
logics studied in this paper. Given a set C of connectives and a logic L, we
denote by L\C the C-free fragment of L, that is, the restriction of L to the
language without the connectives in C.
Theorem 6.1.
1. Classical negation is definable in the logics:
PKT \{`, #`}, PKT \{a,#a}, PKD, PKF , PKD4 and PKDB.
2. Classical negation is not definable in the logics:
PK, PKB, PK4, PKT \{#`,#a}, PKDB\{#`,#a},
PKD\{#`}, PKD\{#a}, PKF \{#`}, PKF \{#a},
PKD4\{#a} and PKD4\{#`}.
Proof.
(1) For PKT \{`, #`} we set ∼ϕ := aϕ ∨ #aϕ, for PKT \{a,#a} we set
∼ϕ := `ϕ∧ #`ϕ, and for PKD and PKF we may set ∼ϕ := (aϕ∧ #`ϕ)∨#aϕ
or, dually, set ∼ϕ := (`ϕ ∨ #aϕ) ∧ #`ϕ. It is easy to see that ⇒ ϕ,∼ϕ
and ϕ,∼ϕ ⇒ are derivable in each system for the defined connective ∼.
Using cut, one obtains the usual sequent rules for classical negation. Figure 1
exhibits the derivations for PKT \{#`,`} (the derivations for PKT \{#a,a}
are analogous), and Figure 2 provides the derivations for PKD for the first
definition above (we leave the second as an exercise for the reader). Given
that PKF is a deductive extension of PKD, the derivations in Figure 2 are
also good for PKF . The same holds for PKD4 and for PKDB, as the rule
[D] is a particular instance of the rule [D4] and also a particular instance of
the rule [DB ].
ϕ⇒ ϕ
ϕ,aϕ⇒
[T2]
ϕ⇒ ϕ,aϕ
ϕ,#aϕ⇒
[#a⇒]
ϕ,aϕ ∨#aϕ⇒
[∨⇒]
ϕ⇒ ϕ aϕ⇒ aϕ
⇒ ϕ,aϕ,#aϕ
[⇒#a]
⇒ ϕ,aϕ ∨#aϕ
[⇒∨]
Figure 1. Definability of negation in PKT \{#`,`}
(2) Let X be one of the logics listed in the statement, and suppose for the
sake of contradiction that classical negation ∼ is definable in X . Let p ∈ P
and let ϕ be ∼(p). Then both ⇒ ϕ, p and p, ϕ ⇒ are valid in X . Consider
a set W that consists of two worlds, w and v, and a valuation V such that
V (w, q) = 1 and V (v, q) = 0 for every atomic formula q (including p). Now,
for each relation RX on W , consider the model MX = 〈〈W,RX〉 , V 〉. If
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ϕ⇒ ϕ
ϕ⇒ ϕ
aϕ⇒ `ϕ
[D]
ϕ,aϕ, #`ϕ⇒
[#`⇒]
ϕ,aϕ ∧ #`ϕ⇒
[∧⇒]
ϕ⇒ ϕ,aϕ
ϕ,#aϕ⇒
[#a⇒]
ϕ, (aϕ ∧ #`ϕ) ∨#aϕ⇒
[∨⇒]
ϕ⇒ ϕ aϕ⇒ aϕ
⇒ ϕ,aϕ,#aϕ
[⇒#a]
ϕ,`ϕ⇒ ϕ,#aϕ
⇒ ϕ, #`ϕ,#aϕ
[⇒#`]
⇒ ϕ, (aϕ ∧ #`ϕ),#aϕ
[⇒∧]
⇒ ϕ, (aϕ ∧ #`ϕ) ∨#aϕ
[⇒∨]
Figure 2. Definability of negation in PKD
MX belongs to the class of models that semantically characterize X , then
we must have that MX , w  ϕ, p ⇒ and MX , v  ⇒ p, ϕ. Since in MX
we have Tw(p) and Fv(p), we must then have Fw(ϕ) and Tv(ϕ). We show
that this is impossible, by structural induction on ϕ. More precisely, we claim
that if Fw(ϕ) then Fv(ϕ). To show this, we consider the given values for X ,
and define the accessibility relation RX in each case. We divide the possible
values for X into four cases:
(A) For X∈{PK,PKB,PK4} define RX = ∅. Note that for these three
logics, MX belongs to the appropriate class of models. If ϕ ∈ P , then
Tw(ϕ) by the definition of the valuation, hence the claim trivially holds.
If ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 for some ϕ1, ϕ2 and Fw(ϕ), then by [T∧] we must have
that either Fw(ϕ1) or Fw(ϕ2). By the induction hypothesis, we have
that either Fv(ϕ1) or Fv(ϕ2), hence Fv(ϕ) by [F∧]. If ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 for
some ϕ1, ϕ2 then this is shown similarly. Now, since RX = ∅, for every
formula ψ we have (a) Fw(`ψ) and (b) Fv(`ψ). In view of (b), the
claim is true if ϕ = `ψ for some ψ. By [T#`], from (a) we conclude that
Tw(#`ψ). Thus, the claim also holds if ϕ = #`ψ, for some ψ. Similarly,
for every formula ψ we have (c) Tw(aψ) and (d) Tv(aψ). In view of (c),
the claim is true if ϕ = aψ for some ψ. By [F#a], from (d) we conclude
Fv(#aψ). Thus, the claim also holds if ϕ = #aψ, for some ψ.
(B) For X = PKT \{#`,#a} or X = PKDB\{#`,#a} define RX = W ×W .
First note that since RX is reflexive and also symmetric, MX belongs
to the appropriate class of models. If ϕ is a propositional variable, a
conjunction, or a disjunction, then the proof is analogous to the previous
case. If ϕ = `ψ for some ψ and Fw(ϕ), then Tw(ψ) and Tv(ψ) by [T`]
and the definition of RX , which implies by [F`] and the definition of RX
that Fv(ϕ). If ϕ = aψ for some ψ and Fw(ϕ), then by [Ta] and the
definition of RX it follows that either Tw(ψ) or Tv(ψ). Either way we
conclude by [Fa] and the definition of RX that Fv(ϕ).
(C) ForX∈{PKD\{#`}, PKF \{#`}, PKD4\{#`}} setRX= {〈w, v〉, 〈v, v〉}.
Note that since RX is a total function, ` and a are indistinguishable,
hence we may choose to consider a instead of `. Moreover, since RX
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is also transitive, MX belongs to the appropriate class of models. The
cases where ϕ is atomic, a conjunction, or a disjunction are immediate.
If ϕ = aψ for some ψ and Fw(ϕ), then we must have Tv(ψ) by [Ta],
which implies by [Fa] that Fv(ϕ). If ϕ = #aψ for some ψ, then Fv(ϕ)
must hold good: indeed, if on the one hand Tw(aψ) then Fv(ψ) by
[Fa], and hence Tv(aψ) by [Ta], which implies by [F#a] that Fv(ϕ); if
on the other hand Fw(aψ) then Tv(ψ) by [Ta], and hence again Fv(ϕ)
follows by [F#a].
(D) ForX∈{PKD\{#a}, PKF \{#a}, PKD4\{#a}} setRX= {〈w,w〉, 〈v, w〉}.
For this case also, note that since RX is both a total function and a
transitive relation,MX belongs to the appropriate class of models. The
proof then proceeds as in item (C), mutatis mutandis. 
Concerning the second part of the preceding proof, it is worth remarking
that in the cases in which classical negation turned out to be definable some
adjustment operator was always used for that purpose. Moreover, the proof
of case (B) actually shows that whenever all derivations in a given logic are
sound with respect to any class of models that includes this model, classical
negation is not definable without the help of #` or #a, as the same argument
applies. In particular, this includes all normal (negative) modal logics up to
(negative) S5, and indeed all the logics in which #`ϕ is not equivalent to ⊤
(logics which are ⌣-paraconsistent) and #aϕ is not equivalent to ⊥ (logics
which are ⌢-paracomplete).
Our next and final section will revisit the introductory comments of the
paper in the light of what we have learned so far.
7. This is possibly not the end
Denying instead of affirming. In contrast to the usual ‘positive modalities’
of normal modal logics, which are monotone with respect to the underlying
notion of consequence, we have devoted this paper to antitone connectives
known as ‘negative modalities’ — specifically, to full type box-minus and
full-type diamond-minus connectives.
Be they monotone or antitone on each of their arguments, the connec-
tives of normal modal logics are always congruential: they treat equivalent
formulas as synonymous. The phenomenon seems to be an exception rather
than the rule if many-valued logics with non-classical negations are involved.
For instance, Kleene’s 3-valued logic fails to be congruential, as p∧¬p is equiv-
alent to q∧¬q, but their respective negations, ¬(p∧¬p) and ¬(q∧¬q), are not
equivalent (where ¬ is Kleene’s negation). Also, the earliest paraconsistent
logic in the literature (cf. [19]) fails to be congruential, in spite of having been
defined in terms of a double translation into a fragment of the modal logic S5,
and such failure remained undetected for decades (cf. [25]). The same holds for
the other early paraconsistent logics developed later on, containing additional
‘strong negations’ that live in the vicinity of classical negation (cf. [28, 7]). Of
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course, there are important ‘non-exceptions’: intuitionistic logic and other in-
termediate logics constitute paracomplete logics with the replacement prop-
erty. For another example of the latter kind, perhaps more to the point,
consider the four-valued logic of FDE, whose semantics may be formulated
having as truth-values {t,b,n, f}, where {t,b} are designated, the reflexive
transitive closure of the order ≤ such that f ≤ n, f ≤ b, n ≤ t and b ≤ t may
be used to define ∧ and ∨, respectively, as its meet and its join, while negation
is defined by setting ¬〈t,b,n, f〉 := 〈f ,b,n, t〉. It is not hard to see that this
logic is congruential and by defining the operators #`〈t,b,n, f〉 := 〈t,n,b, t〉
and #a〈t,b,n, f〉 := 〈f ,n,b, f〉 it gets conservatively extended into another
congruential logic that deductively extends our logic PKF (but does not
deductively extend PKT ), if we read ` as ¬. It is worth noting that the
latter logic is equivalent (through a definitional translation) to the expansion
of FDE by the addition of the operator ∼〈t,b,n, f〉 := 〈f ,n,b, t〉 that plays
the role of classical negation.
Still on what regards congruentiality, Table 1 illustrates how a few vari-
ants of global contraposition happen to be validated by some of our logics.
We use there ‘ser’ to refer to the class of serial frames, ‘sym’ to refer to
symmetric frames, and ‘any’ to refer to arbitrary frames.
Rule Negation Frame property
ϕ |= ψ
−ψ |= −ϕ − as either ` or a [any]
−ϕ |= ψ
−ψ |= ϕ − as ` [sym]
ϕ |= −ψ
ψ |= −ϕ − as a [sym]
`ϕ |= ψ
aψ |= ϕ [ref]
ϕ |= aψ
ψ |= `ϕ [ref]
`ϕ |= aψ
ψ |= ϕ [ref] or [ser+sym]
Table 1
Some of our ancestors. Some terminological conventions and some concepts
used in the present paper were borrowed or adapted from other fonts, some-
times without the due pause for inserting an explicit reference. For instance,
in Section 2, dadaistic and nihilistic models come from [26], and that paper
also introduces the connectives #` and #a of the so-called Logics of Formal In-
consistency (cf. [5]) and the dual Logics of Formal Undeterminedness (cf. [26],
where the adjustment connectives are called connectives ‘of perfection’). The
minimal conditions on negation, called JfalsificatioK and JverificatioK, come
from [27]. The ‘strengthened models’ from Section 3 correspond to models
with strongly-legal valuations in the terminology of [21]. Most rules in Sec-
tions 3 and 5 may be seen as negative counterparts of the corresponding
rules found at [12, Ch. 3], [39], [30, Ch. 2] and [18, Ch. 6]. The rule for PKD,
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for instance, may be thought of as a variation on the following well-known
sequent rule for the modal logic KD: Γ⇒
2Γ⇒ . Also, the rule for PKF is a vari-
ation on the sequent rule from [20] for the ‘Next’ operator in the temporal
logic LTL, namely: Γ⇒∆
2Γ⇒2∆ . Furthermore, in Section 4, the trick behind using
three-valued models for addressing the admissibility of the cut rule goes at
least as far back as [35].
Paraconsistency and paracompleteness. Let P denote the basic system ob-
tained from PK by deleting rules [`⇒] and [⇒a]. Table 4 summarizes all
systems investigated in the present paper, while Tables 2 and 3 summarize
the rules for ` and a, as well as their context relations.
π0 {〈q1 ⇒ ; q1 ⇒〉 , 〈⇒ q1 ; ⇒ q1〉}
π1 {〈q1 ⇒ ; ⇒ `q1〉 , 〈⇒ q1 ; aq1 ⇒〉}
π2 {〈q1 ⇒ ; ⇒ `q1〉 , 〈⇒ q1 ; `q1 ⇒〉}
π3 π1 ∪ {〈`q1 ⇒ ; ⇒ q1〉 , 〈⇒ aq1 ; q1 ⇒〉}
π4 π1 ∪ {〈aq1 ⇒ ; aq1 ⇒〉 , 〈⇒ `q1 ; ⇒ `q1〉}
Table 2. Context relations
The first column of Table 5 recalls some of the basic consecutions char-
acteristic of classical negation and its interaction with ∧, ∨, ⊤ and ⊥, iden-
tifying in the second and third columns the conditions on frames that suffice
to validate them. In this table, [ser], [ref], [sym], [trn] and [fun] refer, respec-
tively, to serial, reflexive, symmetric, transitive and functional frames, and
[any] refers to arbitrary frames.
A richer language in which to study negative modalities. Here is a mean-
ingful illustration of the way in which LFIs and LFUs are said to ‘recover
classical reasoning’, by the addition of appropriate assumptions to the clas-
sical inferences whose validity has been lost by the move to a non-classical
environment. Let a negation ¬ be added to positive classical logic (with ⊃
as the symbol for implication), and consider the standard form of reductio
according to which (conc) p follows from (prem) (¬p ⊃ q) ∧ (¬p ⊃ ¬q). Such
a rule fails both when [CA] and when [DA] (namely, the ‘consistency assump-
tion’ and the ‘determinedness assumption’ that are characteristic of classical
negation, see Section 1) are challenged. As a matter of fact, when [CA] is
not to be presumed, one might produce a counter-example to reductio by
finding a state of affairs satisfying both q and ¬q while not satisfying p, and
when [DA] is not to be counted on, a state of affairs satisfying neither p nor
¬p would provide a counter-example to reductio. This could be fixed if one
replaced (prem) for (prem⋆) Cq ∧ (¬p ⊃ q) ∧ (¬p ⊃ ¬q) and replaced (conc)
for (conc⋆) p∨Dp, adding thus a consistency assumption to the premise and a
determinedness assumption to the conclusion. It should be clear that (conc⋆)
follows from (prem⋆).
The particular languages focused upon in the present paper, of course,
do not include a primitive implication. The fourth column of Table 5 illus-
trates how some other important consecutions from classical logic may be
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Sequent Rule Basic Rule
[`⇒]
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
a∆,`ϕ⇒ `Γ
〈⇒ p1;π1〉 /`p1 ⇒
[⇒a]
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
a∆⇒ aϕ,`Γ
〈p1 ⇒;π1〉 / ⇒ ap1
[D]
Γ⇒ ∆
a∆⇒ `Γ
〈⇒ ; π1〉 / ⇒
[T1]
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ `ϕ,∆
〈p1 ⇒ ; π0〉 / ⇒ `p1
[T2]
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ,aϕ⇒ ∆
〈⇒ p1 ; π0〉 /ap1 ⇒
[Fun]
Γ⇒ ∆
`∆⇒ `Γ
〈⇒ ; π2〉 / ⇒
[B1]
Γ,`Γ′, ϕ⇒ ∆,a∆′
a∆,∆′ ⇒ aϕ,`Γ,Γ′
〈p1 ⇒ ; π3〉 / ⇒ ap1
[B2]
Γ,`Γ′ ⇒ ϕ,∆,a∆′
a∆,∆′,`ϕ⇒ `Γ,Γ′
〈⇒ p1 ; π3〉 /`p1 ⇒
[41]
aΓ,Γ′, ϕ⇒ `∆,∆′
aΓ,a∆′ ⇒ aϕ,`∆,`Γ′
〈p1 ⇒ ; π4〉 / ⇒ ap1
[42]
aΓ,Γ′ ⇒ ϕ,`∆,∆′
aΓ,a∆′,`ϕ⇒ `∆,`Γ′
〈⇒ p1 ; π4〉 /`p1 ⇒
[DB]
`Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,a∆′
∆′,a∆⇒ `Γ,Γ′
〈⇒ ; π3〉 / ⇒
[D4]
aΓ′,Γ⇒ ∆,`∆′
aΓ′,a∆⇒ `Γ,`∆′
〈⇒ ; π4〉 / ⇒
Table 3. Sequent rules
PK P + [a⇒] + [`⇒]
PKD PK+ [D]
PKT PK+ [T1] + [T2]
PKF P + [Fun] + [` = a]
PKB P + [B1] + [B2]
PK4 P + [41] + [42]
PKDB PKB+ [DB]
PKD4 PK4 + [D4]
Table 4. Sequent systems
recovered by some of the logics studied in this paper. Table 6 recalls a few
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Consecution − as ` − as a Derivability adjustments
−⊤ |= [any] [ser]
|= −⊥ [ser] [any]
ϕ,−ϕ |= [ref] #`ϕ,ϕ,`ϕ |= [any]
|= −ϕ, ϕ [ref] |= aϕ, ϕ,#aϕ [any]
−−ϕ |= ϕ [sym] aaϕ |= ϕ,#aϕ [ser+trn]
ϕ |= −−ϕ [sym] #`ϕ,ϕ |= ``ϕ [ser+trn]
−ϕ ∨−ψ |= −(ϕ ∧ ψ) [any] [any]
−ϕ ∨ ψ |= −(ϕ ∧ −ψ) [sym] #`ψ,`ϕ ∨ ψ |= `(ϕ ∧`ψ) [ser+trn]
ϕ ∨−ψ |= −(−ϕ ∧ ψ) [sym] #`ϕ,ϕ ∨`ψ |= `(`ϕ ∧ ψ) [ser+trn]
ϕ ∨ ψ |= −(−ϕ ∧ −ψ) [sym] #`ϕ, #`ψ,ϕ ∨ ψ |= `(`ϕ ∧`ψ) [ser+trn]
−(ϕ ∧ ψ) |= −ϕ ∨ −ψ [any] [fun]
−(ϕ ∧ −ψ) |= −ϕ ∨ ψ [sym] a(ϕ ∧aψ) |= aϕ ∨ ψ,#aψ [trn]
−(−ϕ ∧ ψ) |= ϕ ∨ −ψ [sym] a(aϕ ∧ ψ) |= ϕ ∨aψ,#aϕ [trn]
−(−ϕ ∧ −ψ) |= ϕ ∨ ψ [sym] a(aϕ ∧aψ) |= ϕ ∨ ψ,#aϕ,#aψ [ser+trn]
−ϕ ∧−ψ |= −(ϕ ∨ ψ) [fun] [any]
−ϕ ∧ ψ |= −(ϕ ∨ −ψ) [sym] #`ψ,`ϕ ∧ ψ |= `(ϕ ∨`ψ) [trn]
ϕ ∧−ψ |= −(−ϕ ∨ ψ) [sym] #`ϕ,`ϕ ∧ ψ |= `(ϕ ∨`ψ) [trn]
ϕ ∧ ψ |= −(−ϕ ∨ −ψ) [sym] #`ϕ, #`ψ,`ϕ ∧ ψ |= `(ϕ ∨`ψ) [ser+trn]
−(ϕ ∨ ψ) |= −ϕ ∧ −ψ [any] [any]
−(ϕ ∨ −ψ) |= −ϕ ∧ ψ [sym] a(ϕ ∨aψ) |= aϕ ∧ ψ,#aψ [ser+trn]
−(−ϕ ∨ ψ) |= ϕ ∧ −ψ [sym] a(aϕ ∨ ψ) |= ϕ ∧aψ,#aϕ [ser+trn]
−(−ϕ ∨ −ψ) |= ϕ ∧ ψ [sym] a(ϕ ∨aψ) |= aϕ ∧ ψ,#aϕ,#aψ [ser+trn]
Table 5
of the most important consecutions validated by LFIs introduced in the sur-
vey [5] (namely, related to axioms dubbed (ci) and (ca)), and identify the
conditions on frames that suffice to validate them.
Consecution Property Derivability adjustment
`#`ϕ |= ϕ — `#`ϕ |= ϕ,#aϕ [any]
`#`ϕ |= `ϕ [trn]
#`ϕ, #`ψ |= #`(ϕ ∧ ψ) [any]
#`ϕ, #`ψ |= #`(ϕ ∨ ψ) [any]
Table 6
On what concerns the second pair of consecutions in the latter table
(related to axiom (ca)), that deal with the ‘propagation of consistency’, it
is worth noticing, in the presence of a classical implication, that #`ϕ, #`ψ |=
#`(ϕ ⊃ ψ) is not a valid consecution in normal modal logics, but its variant
#`ψ |= #`(ϕ ⊃ ψ),#aϕ is validated by arbitrary frames.
On the availability of classical negation. We have already pointed out in
Section 1 how a classical negation might be defined within the basic normal
modal logic of arbitrary frames with the help of the modal paraconsistent
negation ` and an additional classical implication. Now, within the modal
logic of reflexive frames one may also define a classical negation with the help
of implication and the modal paracomplete negation a, by simply setting
∼α := α ⊃ aα. Indeed, it is easy to see that the more general consecution |=
p, p ⊃ q would then be valid because of the meaning of classical implication,
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and to check that p, p ⊃ ap |= is also valid one may use modus ponens and
the reflexivity of the underlying frames.
Do the above observations still hold good if the classical implication ⊃
is replaced by the intuitionistic implication? To comment on that, we let
→ be some implication connective, and define ¬1α := α → aα, ¬2α :=
α → `(α → α) and ¬3α := α → a(α → α), so as to briefly discuss in what
follows the relations that involve classical negation and its non-classical modal
cousins. To be sure, some such relations have already been mentioned in
previous sections and the corresponding consecutions are collected in Tables 5
and 7. The latter table also contains some double negation rules in which
negations of different types interact.
Consecution − as a − as `
−ϕ |= ∼ϕ [ref] —
∼ϕ |= −ϕ — [ref]
Consecution
−1 as a,
−2 as `
−1 as `,
−2 as a Derivability adjustment
−1ϕ |= −2ϕ [ser] [fun]
−1−2ϕ |= ϕ
[ref] or
[ser+sym]
`aϕ |= ϕ,#aϕ [trn]
ϕ |= −1−2ϕ
[ref] or
[ser+sym]
#`ϕ, ϕ |= a`ϕ [trn]
Table 7
To facilitate the discussion, we might hereupon say that a 1-ary connec-
tive # is contrary-forming iff it is not #-paraconsistent (that is, if it respects
J#-explosionK), and # is subcontrary-forming iff it is not #-paracomplete
(that is, if it respects J#-implosionK). Additionally, a contradictory-forming
connective is said to be a 1-ary operator that is both contrary-forming and
subcontrary-forming— corresponding to what we here have called a ‘classical
negation’. Generalizing the above, two formulas ϕ and ψ are called contrary
according to a given logic if the consecution ϕ, ψ |= holds good, and are called
subcontrary if the consecution |= ψ, ϕ holds good.
Note on the one hand that if → is classical implication all the three
negations defined above, ¬1, ¬2 and ¬3, are subcontrary-forming connectives.
On the other hand, even if we assume that → is intuitionistic, we see that
while ¬2 is contrary-forming over the logic of arbitrary frames, to obtain the
same effect with ¬3 we need to consider the logic of serial frames, while for ¬1
reflexive frames are on demand.
The nullary connective ⊥ (or any formula equivalent to it, such as `⊤
over the logic of arbitrary frames, or a⊤ over the logic of serial frames) may
be said to be the strongest contrary of any given formula (in the sense that
it entails any other contrary of that very formula), or said to be a ‘global
contrary’ (as it works uniformly as the contrary to any formula); something
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analogous may be said about ⊤ as the strongest/global subcontrary of any
given formula. Note, at any rate, that if #ϕ is equivalent to ⊥, for arbitrary ϕ,
then # fails to be a negation (it does not respect the J#-verificatioK condi-
tion). It is worth pointing out that if→ is intuitionistic implication then ¬2α
is the weakest contrary to the formula α, over the logic of arbitrary frames,
the intuitionistic-like ¬3α plays the same role over the logic of serial frames,
and ¬1α plays that role over the logic of reflexive frames. Both ¬2 and ¬3
may be said then to produce a ‘local contrary’ out of a global contrary. These
are all issues discussed in [16], where the ‘basic logic of contrariety and sub-
contrariety’ is expected to validate the following consecutions that witness
the interaction between the two non-classical types of modal negations: (i)
aϕ |= `ϕ; (ii) a`ϕ |= ϕ; (iii) ϕ |= `aϕ. As we have seen in the present
paper, irrespective of the presence of any kind of implication in the language,
while item (i) is validated by the class of serial frames, to validate items (ii)
and (iii) one should also impose the symmetry of the latter frames. All these
facts can now be easily checked also using the corresponding sequent systems
presented above.
Finally, as another warning concerning the extension of the logics stud-
ied in the present paper by the addition of implication, it is worth noting that
in [16] it is also shown that the identification between the contrary-forming
and the subcontrary-forming negations (that happens, for instance, within
the logic of total functional frames) causes a collapse of intuitionistic impli-
cation into classical implication. As we have seen by the study of PKF in the
present paper, however, imposing the identification between ` and a does
not mean that our non-classical negations end up collapsing into classical
negation, if an implication is not available. All that having been said, it is
worth noting that the framework of basic systems [21] can be used to provide
semantics for all systems studied in this paper augmented with a classical
or an intuitionistic implication. Cut-admissibility, analyticity, and undefin-
ability of classical negation in the resulting extensions are left as matter for
future work.
What is to follow. The main feature of our approach in the present paper
has been to rely on theoretical technology built elsewhere and show how it
may be adapted to the present study. Our hope is that this should prove a
beneficial methodology, and that the idea of obtaining completeness and cut-
admissibility as particular applications of more general results will become
more common, rather than proceeding always through ad hoc completeness
and cut-elimination theorems.
While we have directed our attention, in the present paper, to classes of
frames that turned out to be particular significative from the viewpoint of the
relation between negative modalities of different types, we envisage several
very natural ways of extending this study. A first natural extension would be
to look at other classes of frames that prove to be relevant from the viewpoint
of sub-classical properties of negation. For instance, it is easy to see that the
class of frames with the Church-Rosser property validates ``p |= aap,
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pinpointing an interesting consecution that involves the interaction between
negations of different types. Some other classes of frames deserving study
do not seem to show the same amount of promise, from the viewpoint of
paraconsistency or paracompleteness. For instance, euclidean frames validate
J`-explosionK if in the set of formulas {`p, p} one replaces p by `r (this is
explained by the fact that formulas of the form `ϕ are consistent — in other
words, formulas of the form #``ϕ turn out to be validated), and also validate
Ja-implosionK if in {ap, p} one replaces p by ar; in contrast, the transitive
frames studied in Section 5.5 cause a similar behavior, but swapping the
roles of `r and ar in replacing p. The latter phenomena (see the notion of
‘controllable explosion’ in [5]) is summarized in Table 8.
Consecution − as ` − as a
−ϕ,−−ϕ |= [euc] [ser+trn]
|= −−ϕ,−ϕ [ser+trn] [euc]
−ϕ,`−ϕ |= — [trn]
|= a−ϕ,−ϕ [trn] —
|= #−−ϕ [euc] —
#−−ϕ |= — [euc]
|= #`−ϕ — [trn]
#a−ϕ |= [trn] —
Table 8
A second avenue worth exploring would lead us into logics containing more
than one negative modality of the same type (as it has been done for logics
with multiple paracomplete negations in [33]). One could for instance consider
not only the ‘forward-looking’ negative modalities defined by the semantic
clauses [S`] and [Sa], but also ‘backward-looking’ negative modalities `−1
and a−1 defined by the clauses obtained from the latter ones by replacing
wRv by vRw (such ‘converse modalities’ have been studied in the context of
temporal logic [31], as well as in the context of the so-called Heyting-Brouwer
logic [32], and more recently have been given a treatment in terms of display
logic calculi and multi-relational frames [29]). The interaction between the
various negations would then be witnessed, in such extended language, by
the validity over arbitrary frames of ‘pure’ consecutions such as `−1`p |= p
and ``−1p |= p (as well as p |= a−1ap and p |= aa−1p) and forms of
global contraposition such as ϕ |= aψ
ψ |= a−1ϕ
and `ϕ |= ψ
`
−1ψ |= ϕ
(as well as ϕ |= a
−1ψ
ψ |= aϕ and
`
−1ϕ |= ψ
`ψ |= ϕ ), and by the validity over symmetric frames of ‘mixed’ consecutions
such as a−1`p |= p and a`−1p |= p (as well as p |= `−1ap and p |= `a−1p).
In our view, it seems worth the effort applying the machinery employed in the
present paper to the above mentioned systems, and still others, in order to
investigate results analogous to the ones we have here looked at. In particular,
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Proposition 4.28 of [21], that was used here for symmetric and transitive
frames, provides a tool for constructing two accessibility relations that are
inverse to one another, and thus one may serve as the ‘backward-looking’
version of the other.
Yet another direction for future research is the combination of certain
frame properties. We have initiated such study in Section 5.6, where models
that are both transitive and serial, or both symmetric and serial were ad-
dressed. The main challenge one would face pursuing this direction is that
most basic rules discussed in the present paper employ different context rela-
tions, and hence, according to the semantics of basic systems, their combina-
tion characterizes models that are equipped with several distinct accessibility
relations. In the case of Section 5.6, this was remedied by finding a different
rule for seriality, that utilizes the same context-relation as the rule for transi-
tivity. A similar solution was implemented for the combination of symmetry
and seriality (captured in isolation by systems PKB with PKD). To deal
with such a combination, we had to adapt the method for extending partial
models. Combining PKD with either PKT or PKF is of course redundant,
as reflexive relations and total functions are already serial. Also, the rules
for PKT employ π0, which is already used for the classical connectives, and
thus do not require an additional accessibility relation. Combining reflexivity
with other frame properties seems therefore more promising in the context
of cut-free sequent systems, however not if this is to involve other logics that
are free of classical negation (given that already in PKT classical negation is
definable with the help of either one of the adjustment connectives).
One aspect that laid beyond the scope for the current paper was the
prospect of using non-normal modal logics to define negative modalities. The
idea is roughly the same: on the semantic side, interpreting the negative
modal operators as impossibility and unnecessity, and on the proof-theoretic
side, converting derivation rules for non-normal modal logics into ‘negative’
ones. From that perspective, it is worth noting that the ‘regular’ and ‘co-
regular’ negations introduced in [38], yet very natural, fail to be ‘full type’
modalities. Many proof systems for positive non-normal modal logics (e.g.
all ordinary sequent systems from [24]) are actually basic systems, thus are
amenable to an analysis similar to the one proposed here. We also note that
positive and negative modalities within non-distributive logics are investi-
gated in [15] from an algebraic point of view, and in [14] the algebraic study
of such logics is also complemented by proof-theoretical presentations in terms
of display calculi.
At last, it is also worth stressing some specific problems that were left
open in the present paper. For instance, an analytic proof system for neg-
ative modalities over euclidean frames (corresponding to the logic K5) was
not presented here. The sequent rule for K5 from [37] may indeed be adapted
to the study of negative modalities; however, unlike what happens with the
other cases studied here, the framework of basic systems falls short to handle
this logic, as some of its strengthened models are not euclidean. As another
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example, it was established in Section 6 that classical negation is definable
in full PKDB, but not without #` and #a. Whether only one of the latter ad-
justment connectives suffices for such a definition is left as matter for further
research, as the methods developed here for attacking this question seem to
leave it unanswered. Indeed, the definitions of classical negation for PKT fail
in PKDB, and the countermodels presented for #`-free and #a-free logics are
not suitable for it. Finally, cut-admissibility of our system PKB is currently
left open. Note that for the situation in which the #`#a-fragment of PKB
is augmented with an implication connective, [3] includes an example of a
derivable sequent that has no cut-free proof. However, the languages that we
considered here, and in particular, the language of PKB, do not include a
native implication connective.∗∗
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